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On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce:
A Model Statute & Commentary*
JOSEPH GOLDSTEINt & MAX GITTER**
Introduction
Hardly a legislative session in any state goes by without a proposal
to reform admittedly archaic divorce laws. We offer here the
working draft of a statute with commentary, which we immod-
estly call a "model" and which we hope may ease the task of
legislatures concerned with divorce "reform."
We propose that the existing "fault" system, whereby one
spouse must prove the "misconduct" of the other to obtain or
prevent a divorce, be abolished. The statute deals primarily with
the process by which spouses may change their legal status from
married to single. Although we offer a policy position and
procedure which should facilitate a more precise identification of
the problems for decisions concerned with child disposition and
finances we do not define standards for their resolution. The
concepts of "grounds for divorce" and "fault" are sufficiently
complex by themselves to warrant separate treatment in a
statutory proposal. Furthermore the analytic separability of the
process for determining the status of the parties from the
processes for resolving issues of finance and child custody is
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recognized both by the so-called "divisible divorce" doctrine' and
by the courts' traditional jurisdiction to determine and redeter-
mine those issues before and even after divorce is decreed.
We focus, in short, on the process by which parties may change,
without the intervention of death, their status from married to
single. Consequently, the proposed statute can be enacted without
modifying existing guides for decisions concerning property,
alimony and children, except to the extent that statute and
case-law make any grounds for divorce "relevant" to these issues.
The statute provides that husband or wife, or both, may begin a
divorce action by filing a simple Application for Divorce with the
court. A waiting period follows, during which the parties may
reconsider their decision to divorce, seek counseling, agree to
post-divorce arrangements, or, failing agreement, apply to the
court for hearings regarding finances and child custody. At the end
of the "cooling-off" or "warming-up" period, if they have not
changed their minds, they so indicate by filing a petition for a
Decree of Divorce. As an inducement for them to negotiate mutual-
ly satisfactory financial and child custody arrangements the statute
provides that as soon as the parties reach agreement on these
matters they may petition for a decree without waiting until the
expiration of the statutory period. If at the end of that period
agreement has not been reached, the court holds a hearing to
determine finances and custody, and embodies its order in the
Decree of Divorce. Provision is also made for either or both parties
to apply to the court, at any time after the filing of an Application
for Divorce, for a hearing to resolve financial and custody
disputes. In no event can either party unilaterally prevent the
issuance of a Decree of Divorce beyond the statutory period. 2
1. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), which recognizes the divisibility of
decrees of divorce by distinguishing that part of the decree which terminates the
marriage from that part which provides for payment of alimony, and May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528 (1953), which does the same for custody.
2. By an identical procedure the status of legal separation may be established.
Separation is retained primarily to provide those who wish to live apart while "married"
access to the court for purposes of resolving financial and child custody matters. Limited
provision is also made for annulment in specified situations merely as a convenience for
the parties.
A brief outline of the policies and procedures out of which this proposal grew is found
in J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ THE FAMILY AND THE LAW, (hereinafter cited as THE
FAMILY AND THE LAW) 813-814 (1965):
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The statute, while in many respects not new, is a fundamental
departure from existing law. 3 It follows the rationale which
underlies many "reforms" in this area to the point where that
reasoning leads when freed of legislative and judicial ambivalence
about fixing blame, about the state's interest in marriage, and
about the limits of law. Unlike those "reforms" it is not a
compromise which leaves substantially unchanged an unsound
system. The significantly new feature of the proposed statute is
that divorce cannot be denied; that proof of any ground, even
desertic1n, enforced separation or "marriage breakdown" is not
1. Any married couple or person wishing a divorce shall request the issuance of an
application for divorce.
2. If one spouse does not join in the initial request he or she shall be given notice of
the request.
3. A state counsellor shall receive notice of the filing of such a request. He shall then
offer to arrange a meeting between both spouses to explore the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed course of action.
4. Three (or "?") months from the date of notice there shall be issued to both
spouses an application for a divorce decree, unless the initial request for application
has been withdrawn.
5. The application for a divorce decree will require the following information: Date
of marriage, the name of both spouses, the name and date of birth of each of their
children, and whether special proceedings are needed to resolve any disputes about
custody or finances. Such proceedings may also be requested by counsel for the
children.
6. Failing a private settlement about custody between the spouses and counsel for
the children and, prior to the issuance of a decree, the court shall conduct a hearing
designed to determine an appropriate disposition. Similarly, failing a private settlement
of economic obligations, a hearing shall be held to dispose of that issue. Decisions
about children and finances, whether negotiated or judicially determined, shall be part
of the divorce decree.
7. Six (or "?") months following the issuance of the application the court shall enter
a decree of divorce in favor of both spouses despite the opposition of one spouse
unless prior to that time both spouses have advised the court that they do not wish a
divorce. [Alternatively, the burden could be on either applicant to petition the court
at the end of such a period to issue a decree.]
8. The decree shall restore to each of the parties eligibility for marriage. And see
generally Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury 52 VA. L. REV. 32
(1966).
3. Two jurisdictions- District of Columbia and North Carolina permit divorce after
voluntary separation for one year, D.C. Code Encyc. § 16-904 (a) 1965; GEN. STATS.
NORTH CAROLINA § 50-6 (1965). Hawaii prescribes a period of six months for
desertion, REVISED LAWS OF HAWAII § 324-20(b)(1965). Twenty-one other states
provide for divorce based upon the ground of separation, M.F. MAYER, DIVORCE
AND ANNULMENT IN THE 50 STATES, 4, 32 (1967). Virginia courts, furthermore,
hold that the spouse who initiates a separation for the statutory period may obtain a
divorce, notwithstanding the objection of the "offended" spouse, Canavos v. Canavos,
205 Va. 744,139 S.E.2d 825 (1965). Finally, better reasoned opinions in California
have effectively abolished the doctrine of recrimination by granting divorce to both
parties at "fault." See, e.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P. 2d 598 (1952).
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required as a condition for obtaining a divorce. In order to avoid
intrusions upon personal privacy, but more importantly because
the evidence obtained through such intrusions is not relevant to
any legitimate interest of the state, the statute, unlike recent
divorce proposals, 4 does not permit judicial inquiry to determine
and assure that the marriage has in fact, "broken down." The
invasions of privacy in such proceedings might prove to be even
greater than those under current practice, particularly since courts
would find it difficult to exclude any evidence as not "relevant,"
and they might be less inclined, at least initially, to follow the
commonplace uncontested divorce ritual.5 A decision to divorce
reached after expiration of the statutory period should be proof
enough, if the state has a legitimate interest in such proof, that a
marriage has "broken down." By not requiring or inviting public
exposure of an individual's personal reasons for wanting or not
wanting a divorce the proposed statute serves to safeguard the
privacy of all interested parties.
Before presenting the model statute, with annotations, we
comment on the policy considerations and choices which
prompted its design.
General Commentary
I. The Fault System
Our initial and paramount concern has been to design a statute
which accords with the state's interest in safeguarding the integrity
of the family. That concern led inevitably to the recognition that
the state's overriding goal is not to preserve "marriages" which are
marriages in name only but rather to foster viable family
relationships and, in the event of divorce, to minimize damage to
residual and reorganized family relationships. The concept of
"fault," we conclude, and the process by which "fault" is
established undermine these state goals and jeopardize other
important community values. Furthermore, grounds for divorce,
4. See the report of Archbishop of Canterbury's Group, Putting Asunder: A Divorce
Law for Contemporary Society (1966); Kleinfield & Moss, A Divorce Reform Act, 5
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 563 (1968).
5. From the standpoint of marital privacy, therefore, the present system may
actually be preferable to these more "liberal" proposals.
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with or without fault, are not relevant to the functions or
consequences of divorce-i.e., to decisions concerning the eligibil-
ity of an adult to marry, the equitable division of financial
resources, and the interests of the children.
A. GROUNDS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Founding the grant or denial of divorce upon a showing of the
"fault" of one of the parties places judges in the position of having
to fix the blame and decide which party, if either, is the more
"deserving" of divorce. But the breakdown of a marriage is seldom
the "fault" of one of the partners. It results, rather, from a much
more complex interaction between two, and frequently more than
two, personalities. Even if "blameworthiness" were taken into
account it is often impossible to tell who is the "guilty" party, for
one cannot know what conduct, intangible and even unintended,
on the part of the "innocent" party may have driven the "guilty"
party to his "blameworthy" act. We all know how unjust and
useless is the effort to determine "Who started it?" amongst our
quarrelling friends or children. For purposes of granting or
denying divorce, nothing and no one in the judicial process can
make that kind of determination more just or useful. Dramatic
examples of the complexity of marital interaction and the
difficulty of determining who is the so-called "guilty" party are
furnished by Nims v. Nims, and Lesser v. Lesser.6 In Nims, the
wife, accused of adultery, in turn placed the blame on the husband
who, she testified, refused to consider her sexual satisfaction,
refused to be patient with her, and consistently accused her of
frigidity. In Lesser, a case litigated for more than seven years at a
cost of at least $15,000 to the taxpayers in court time and not less
than $45,000 to the Lesser family in counsel fees, each party, in
turn, accused the other of demeaning his or her religion and
religious practices, and in counterpoint each testified to numerous
instances of such abuse.
Under a grounds system, with or without fault, dead and
destructive human relationships are prolonged when divorce is
6. Substantial portions of the record are set out in THE FAMILY AND THE LAW,
supra n. 2, at 682-697 & 15 ff-562 (1965). Under the parsimony-of-footnotes doctrine
we have refrained from specifically citing support for many textual points, support for
which can be found in Chapters I & II of THE FAMILY AND THE LAW.
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denied. Where the technical grounds cannot be found or manufac-
tured, the parties may both live in abject misery, in an
arrangement neither may want but which must be continued, at
least in name, by legislative fiat.
The state, in fact, has no way to implement a denial of divorce; it
cannot force people to establish a meaningful relationship. But
courts and legislatures have been unable to accept this fact about
the limits of law. Their blindness has led not only to the retention
of grounds but also to the development of the absurd and cruel
concepts of recrimination and condonation. Under the doctrine of
recrimination, despite the fact that each spouse is able to establish
a ground for divorce, the state denies divorce to both since neither
is free of "fault"; it reaffirms the "marriage" status and thereby
denies the right of each to live as a single person under law or to
establish a different, perhaps more meaningful legal relationship.
Under the doctrine of condonation, despite the unsuccessful good
faith efforts of one spouse to save the marriage, divorce is denied
notwithstanding the other spouse's "fault." In each of these
situations the "fault" system forces the parties to remain in
unsatisfactory family relationships, forces them to seek illicit ones,
forces them to commit fraud upon the court, or forces them to
obtain a costly migratory divorce.
The uncontested divorce and the "migratory" divorce, inevitable
concomitants of a "fault" system, are often procured on sham
grounds with a sham residence. Both demean the legal profession
and the judicial system. Parties unable or unwilling to place
themselves within the statutory grounds, but who desperately
want a divorce, are forced to create the grounds in an uncontested
divorce action with largely perjured testimony, or to establish an
out-of-state residence for divorce purposes, or to do both. These
subterfuge procedures, the uncontested divorce and the migratory
divorce, while frequently described as "mockeries of the judicial
system," have in fact understandably grown from recognition by
practitioners and the judiciary that the concept of "fault" is an
unreasonable, unworkable, and irrelevant standard which makes a
"mockery of marriage." The respect and standing of the legal
community can only benefit by the repeal of a system which
produces collusion, perjury, and hypocrisy, and which forces upon
judges tasks alien to their special competence.
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B. GROUNDS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Perhaps the most damaging result of a "fault"-based divorce
procedure is that it exacerbates the aggressive forces that may be
already undermining the family. It dissipates family emotional and
financial resources at a time when they are most needed. The
hatred, bitterness, and resentment fed by a drawn-out divorce are
likely to destroy the possibility of conciliation and distort the
negotiations and proceedings designed to resolve the very difficult
and emotionally-freighted issues of finances and child custody. 7
Thus, the contest, whether in court or in negotiation, can often
prevent the development of amicable relations after divorce-rela-
tions essential to the well-being of the children and of the newly
reorganized "family."
The adverse effects of such state-sponsored battles are incalcula-
ble. The loyalties of the children become sharply divided while
each parent attempts to win over each child to his side and
attempts to destroy the relation between the child and the other
parent. Thus the ties between the adults, and between them and
their children are reinforced not by bonds of affection but by the
destructive bonds of aggression. Even if the state's provision of an
arena for extending conflict could be shown to have a therapeutic
value for some, it could not be justified, for the substantive guides
for decision in a "fault" system are in no way related to the
possible consequences of the decision to be made. There is then no
reason in law, morality or therapy for the state to sponsor such
battles, to perpetuate a process of decision which so undermines its
interest in healthy family life. The least detrimental, if not the
healthiest, family arrangement for the children and the adults may
often be achieved only through the divorce of parents who no
longer wish to be married to each other. It is difficult to under-
stand how denial of divorce to such parties can be beneficial to the
parties or the children, let alone the state.
7. "Fault," as a requirement for divorce or as a means of preventing it creeps into
and distorts the resolution of financial and custody matters, diverting attention from the
interests and needs of the children, the financial capacities and needs of the parties, and
so on. Practising attorneys sometimes urge that "fault" is a useful and necessary
negotiating lever by which the "weaker" spouse is able to effect a "better," but not
necessarily fairer, financial bargain. With "fault" abolished a more rational procedure
may be devised to protect the "weaker" spouse, focusing attention on the function and
purpose of financial and child custody arrangements which ought to have nothing to do
with punishment or arm-twisitng. See n. 20, infra.
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C. GROUNDS AND PRIVACY
The requirement of disclosing, in open court or in the lawyer's
office, any of the various grounds for divorce such as adultery,
intemperance, or cruelty entails a public exposure of the most
intimate and often embarrassing details of married life. The
casebooks and reported decisions are filled with instances of
husband or wife having to reveal-indeed display-the most private
personal problems, marital squabbles, petty annoyances, religious
beliefs, parental feelings, and sexual difficulties, to inventory a few
of the factors that might constitute proof of a ground for granting
or denying divorce.
Such exposure and state invasion of private affairs is not only
irrelevant to any legitimate state interest but is abhorrent to the
community in any other context. In Griswold v. Connecticut8 the
United States Supreme Court struck down a statute involving a
much lesser state invasion of marital privacy. The Court held
unconstitutional Connecticut's birth control law as an invasion of
the privacy of the marriage relationship in flagrant disregard of our
most cherished traditions and values:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. 9
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly
underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the right to marital
privacy.., are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights
specifically protected [by the Bill of Rights.] 10
The invasions of privacy in divorce contests are far greater than
those struck down in Griswold; they can only demean the
marriage relationship, humiliate the parties, and damage the
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. Id. at 485-86.
10. Id. at 495, (Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg).
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residual family relationships, whatever the outcome of the
contest.I 1
D. GROUNDS AND ADULT RESPONSIBILITY
In establishing statutory grounds the state, not the individuals
directly concerned, decides what conduct justifies divorce. If one
partner has committed some statutory misconduct the other
partner may obtain a divorce without ever facing the real question
of whether the marriage should be terminated. Neither party need
confront the crucial questions: "Should I get a divorce?"; "What
would be the consequences of divorce for me and my family?"
Instead he may seize on the statutory grounds, blame his partner
for the breakup of the marriage, and use the misconduct to exploit
the negotiations or proceedings on financial matters and custody
of children, asking only the superficial questions, "Can I get a
divorce?" or "Can I prevent my spouse from getting a divorce?"
Abolition of state-created excuses leaves responsibility for the
difficult decision where it really belongs-with the adult parties
who must live with it-and serves the state's interests of protecting
and preserving the integrity of family relationships. Of course it is
a legal fiction to assume that all adults are "adult" and capable of
making the "right" decision. But the opposite fiction-that adults
are children incapable either of reaching decisions or of seeking
help when they want it, rather than when some government
official thinks they need it-is alien to a democratic society and
rests on still another fiction-that the court has the capacity to
effectively manage the day-to-day relationships of those it insists
must live together. Adoption of such a fiction would further
undermine the fundamental right of each individual to be free
from government intrusion in the ordering of his personal affairs.
That right, another aspect of the right of privacy, rests to a large
degree on the presumption that all adults are "adult."l 2
Moreover, the notion that elimination of legal "fault" somehow
makes it easier for people to decide to divorce is a myth. It is, as
Nora Johnson conveys, a difficult and awesome decision:
11. Divorce practice may compromise other constitutional vlaues. See Schwaber v.
Schwaber, 36 L.W. 2469 (Bait. City Ct., Feb 6, 1968) where the wife was denied a
divorce when the husband refused to testify to his alleged adultery on Fifth Amendment
grounds.
12. But like children, adults should be entitled to make a mistake without
encountering the enormous resistance of the state when they try to correct it.
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The moment when it first becomes apparent that one's marriage was a
mistake is the beginning of probably the longest, darkest period in the
human lifetime. It sets in motion the profound thinking that should have
taken place during the easier and happier time, the engagement, when all
the trouble really started, and it brings into the situation many more
people-children, if there are any, funereal parents, doctors, lawyers,
marriage counselors, psychiatrists, and well-meaning friends, each of
whom makes it his personal business to rush in and try to save the
marriage.
The exhaustive and completely personal search for what is right can be
carried on in only one mind at a time, in an atmosphere of privacy,
something hard to come by in a land where the virtuous voices of Main
Street keep repeating themselves with the typically American predilection
for noisy morality. Being such a nation of faith healers, we really think
that we can solve others' problems from our own pedestals of perfection,
and what we like to call an objective point of view. I doubt if there is one
married person on earth who can be objective about divorce. It is always a
threat, admittedly or not, and such a dire threat that it is almost a dirty
word.
Admittedly, there must be forbearance on both sides when a marriage is
under strain. [The idea that] two people ... are simply running out, are
not facing the problem, and are being generally irresponsible [is] based
on the fantastic but popular assumption, probably dreamed up by
unhappily married people, that leaving is easier than staying. 1 3
Finally, for those who do find the decision to divorce an easy one,
we would ask whether any and what state interest is undermined
when they are allowed to divorce or separate without substantial
legal impediments.
II. Guides for Legislative Decision
For the above reasons we would abolish grounds and the concept
of "fault" as bases for the grant or denial of divorce.Recognizing
the limits of the law and the conflict between actual practice and
the state's goal of safeguarding the family and protecting the
dignity of each of its members, we urge instead the following
principles as guides in the drafting of any new divorce procedure.
A divorce statute, like all legislation regarding private and personal
arrangements, must follow a policy of minimum state intervention
13. Nora Johnson, A Marriage on the Rocks, 210 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 48-50
(July, 1962).
HeinOnline -- 3 Fam. L.Q. 84 1969
Goldstein & Gitter: Abolition of Divorce Grounds 85
consistent with the state's overall goals. It must respect the privacy
and integrity of the marriage relationship and of all the individuals
involved.
A divorce statute must leave the decision to divorce or remain
married with the adults involved. A divorce procedure must
acknowledge the inability of the law to order highly personal
human relationships and recognize that:
The law doesn't really divorce husbands and wives. It seems to think it
does, but in fact they "divorce" themselves .... [T] he law by making guilt
the index of marriage failure and by placing so much emphasis upon
grounds or forms of guilt has contributed to its own failure in its avowed
purpose to preserve marriage and the family. It is not preventive; it is
punitive. It does not conserve; it disserves. 14
A divorce statute must protect the parties from coerced
decisions. It must safeguard the interests of the children, and
provide the adult partners with an opportunity to avoid "rash"
decisions.
A divorce statute must neither discourage cooperation and
good-faith efforts to resolve the difficult issues of finance and
custody, nor aggravate the tensions and hostile emotions that
accompany the breakup of a marriage.
Divorce procedure must facilitate, or at least not undermine, the
development of sound reorganized family relationships.
A divorce statute must make divorce equally available to people
who, because of financial incapacity, are unable to meet counsel
and court costs or other expenses including those of a migratory
divorce.
A divorce statute must realistically recognize the laws' limits
in order to safeguard the integrity of the bar and judicial sys-
tem.
There are probably many statutory designs which could conform
to these guiding principles. 15 Therefore, before presenting our
14. P. Alexander, The Follies of Divorce, 36 A.B.A.J., 106-07 (1950).
15. These views accord with those adopted by the Citizens' Advisory Council on the
Status of Women which offered the following principles as guides to revision of state
divorce laws.
"1. Where it is contemplated that a marriage is to be broken, there should be a
sufficient time lapse before a divorce is granted, regardless of the cause of break-up, to
permit the respective parties to reconsider, seek counseling if they wish, and perhaps
change their minds.
"2. Marraige is basically a private relationship which should not be manipulated
by government, absent an overriding interest.
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design, we briefly note some of the implications of these principles
for certain problems of decision that are likely to arise in the
drafting or administration of any divorce code.
A. UNILATERAL DIVORCE
The court should not be empowered to deny divorce because one
spouse or a child of the marriage objects. Granting divorce, even
over objection, best serves the state's goal of maximizing indi-
vidual freedom. Denial of divorce means that both parties, though
no longer a viable marital unit, are denied the freedom to establish
meaningful new as well as residual family relationships. Granting
divorce, on the other hand, frees each individual to decide to
marry or not to marry, even to decide to remarry one another.
This policy-that no marriage must be maintained without the full
and free consent of husband and wife-is but a concomitant of the
state's unassailable policy that no marriage can be established
without the full and free consent of the parties. 1 6
"3. The concept that there must be a guilty party to any divorce is unrealistic and
unnecessarily creates hostility between the parties, which is often detrimental to their
children." REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW AND POLICY 52
(April, 1968).
And the presiding judge of the marriage court for the Archdiocese of New
York, Msgr. Stephen J. Kelleher, proposed that Catholics involved in " 'intolerable
marriage' be permitted to decide for themselves whether they are morally free to
remarry." The Problem of the Intolerable Marriage-A Call for Substantial Changes in
Ecclesiastical Laws and Courts Dealing with Marriage Cases, AMERICA, p. 178, Sept. 14,
1968.
16. See the United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for
Marriage, and Registration of Marriages [Annex to General Assembly resolution 1763A
(XVII) of November 9, 1962.1
"Full and Free Consent. The principal provision of the Convention (Article 1(1)) reads
as follows:
'No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both
parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person after due publicity and in the
presences of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage and of witnesses, as
prescribed by law.'
"Such 'full and free' consent must be in existence at the moment of the celebration of
the marriage, i.e., when it is to be expressed by both parties in person in the presence of
the authority and of witnesses. A consent expressed previously but no longer in
existence at the moment of the celebration is not sufficient. The fact that the parties had
earlier made a 'contract to marry,' have become 'engaged,' does not meet the
requirements of the Convention if either party to the engagement has changed his or her
mind in the period between engagement and marriage ceremony.
"The Convention is the outcome of a recommendation adopted in 1956 by the
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B. CONCILIATION
Nothing in the guiding principles suggests the necessity or even the
desirability of a state-sponsored conciliation service. If, however,
such conciliation services are deemed appropriate, they must be
voluntary, not mandatory; they must be confidential, not public;
and they must be assigned the task, not of bringing parties
together, but rather of assisting them to clarify for themselves
what they really wish to do. This may mean reconciliation. But it
may just as well mean separation or divorce. The criteria of success
of such a service would not be the percentage of reconciliations
achieved but, rather, the percentage of individuals who were able
to clarify what they wished to do and how they wished to do it.
Whatever the function assigned to such a service it must not
become another vehicle for the public stripping and personal
invasions of privacy eliminated with the abolition of grounds and
"fault." Finally, any incentives beyond the statutory waiting
period to encourage the use of conciliation services must avoid
that degree of compulsion which would reintroduce "fault" by,
for example, providing for the denial of divorce to any spouse who
refused to use a concilation service.1 7
C. CHILDREN AND FINANCES
While agreements between husband and wife concerning the
disposition of property and children must be presumed valid in
accord with the goal of minimal state intervention, procedures
must be devised to assure that such agreements reflect the
informed and free consent of the parties. In accord with the
Conference which drew up the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similax to Slavery." Schwelb, Marriage and
Human Rights, 12 AM. J. OF COMP. L., 337, 351 (1963).
Marriage perceived as only a contract leads us to the same conclusion. See 6 CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 1204 (1964):
"It is almost universally held that a contract for personal services will not be
specifically enforced, either by an affirmative decree or injunction." Id. at 398;
There are several different kinds of reasons that have been given for refusing specific
enforcement of personal service contracts. One of these is the difficulty of enforcing the
decree and of gauging the quality of the performance rendered." Id. at 400;
"A second reason is that we have a strong prejudice against any kind of involuntary
personal servitude. We insist upon liberty even at the expense of broken promises." Id. at
401.
17. For a collection of materials dealing with the issues raised by conciliation services,
see FAMILY AND THE LAW supra n.2, at 122-171.
HeinOnline -- 3 Fam. L.Q. 87 1969
88 Family Law Quarterly
societal mode that assigns responsibility for the growth, develop-
ment, and support of children to their parents, the presumption
should be in favor of incorporating such agreements in any divorce
decree. Since experience suggests, however, that husband and wife
may use children and finances as tools of coercion in negotiations,
granting children party status and representation by counsel may
be advisable. Once all parties, including children, are adequately
represented in negotiations, judicial scrutiny of agreements should
be kept to a minimum.
Failure of the parents to agree on matters concerning children
thrusts upon the state responsibility for decisions ordinarily left to
parents. Under such circumstances, party status and separate
representation for the substantial interests of the children become
imperative. The primary function of such representation should be
to assure an informed decision by the court as to who should be
designated "parent." In accord with the legislative guides set forth
above, such custody decisions should be final and place the newly
designated parent in the same legal position as any other parent
with responsibility for the care of a child. The courts should not
fashion decrees which allow intrusions upon the private day-to-day
relations between the child and the newly designated parent. The
newly established parent-child relationship should be subject only
to those intrusions which are or should be authorized for all
parent-child relationships-as in education, child abuse and neglect
statutes.l 8
18. This position agrees with psychoanalytic findings on child development: "Anna
Freud's work ... demonstrates the need of every child for unbroken continuity of
affectionate and stimulating relationships. Her formulation pours content into that aspect
of the law's standard which is concerned with psychological wellbeing. It calls into
question decisions which split the custody of a child between two parents or which
provide a non-custodial parent with the right to visit or to force the child to visit. It casts
doubt upon traditional procedures which never finalize a custody decision in divorce but
instead allow the court to retain jurisdiction to modify and remodify custody. Such
official invitations to discontinuity in the life of a child are but illustrative of the many
decisions in law which persistently run contrary to the professed purpose of the
decisions themselves-to serve the child's best interest." J. Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and
Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L. J. 1053, 1073-4 (1968).
On party status for children see FAMILY AND THE LAW, supra n.3, at 281-299;
KLEINFIELD & MOSS supra n. 21, at 573-579, 582-585; and TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY LAW, supra n. 15, at 23-24. On finances, see note 20, infra.
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Proposed Statute Annotated
Section I. Application for Divorce or Separation
Any married person or couple may file an Application for Divorce or
Separation with the Court [having jurisdiction over the area in which
either of the spouses resides]. In case only one spouse files an application
hereunder, the other spouse shall receive notice thereof in accord with
Section IX. If within one year of the filing of an Application, no Petition
for Divorce or Separation has been made under Section 11, the
Application shall cease to remain in force; and no Petition can be made
under the next section until a new Application is filed.
The Application for Divorce or Separation shall contain the names of
the parties to the marriage, the date and place of the marriage, the date
and place of birth of each child of the marriage, and the current residence
of each party.
Comment
The initiating document is called an "Application" to distinguish
it, and the entire procedure, from the practice of requiring
pleadings, a cause of action, and plaintiff and defendant. The
procedure is designed to allow cooperation between the parties
and reduce unnecessary tensions and fighting, although it retains
adversary proceedings to resolve disputed questions concerning
children and finances. Either or both parties may apply for a
divorce or separation by filing an Application.
The notice provision here refers to the form of notice required
by Section IX, infra. The goal throughout is actual notice to the
other party. Where the issues and consequences to both partners
are as important as they may be in a divorce, every reasonable
effort must be made to effect actual notice. Actual notice is
especially important at this stage of the procedure since the
waiting period is designed to provide an opportunity for concilia-
tion, discussion, and agreement.
The Application lapses one year from the date of filing. This is
designed to prevent, for example, a spouse who files an Applica-
tion from keeping it in reserve indefinitely and ready to file a
Petition so as to defeat the purposes of the waiting period. The
data required on the form are for ordinary administrative
purposes.
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Section I1. Decree of Divorce or Separation
a) Six months after the filing of an Application for Divorce or
Separation, either spouse or both spouses may petition the court for a
Decree of Divorce or Separation. If the spouses have concluded mutually
satisfactory financial arrangements and custodial arrangements for their
children, they may petition the court for either Decree three months after
the filing of an Application.
Upon proof that the spouses have reached informed, voluntary and
economically reasonable agreement on financial matters and custodial
arrangements for their children, the court shall issue a Decree of Divorce
or Separation, which shall include the terms of the spouses' agreement.
When the spouses do not reach agreement, or whenever only one spouse
appears before the court, or whenever the children object to the
agreement through their representative, the court shall decide the
financial and custody issues in Special Proceedings as provided in this
statute, and its order shall be made part of the Decree of Divorce or
Separation; provided, however, that the objections of one of the parties
shall not prevent issuance of the Decree prior to a final resolution of the
financial and/or custody issues.
b) In any case where only one spouse files a petition for Decree of
Divorce or of Separation, the other spouse shall receive notice of said
Petition in accord with Section IX. Likewise, where only one spouse
appears at the issuance of the Decree of Divorce or Separation, the other
spouse shall receive such notice and a copy of the Decree.
c) Whenever it appears that a spouse has not received actual notice of a
Petition for Decree of Divorce, a Decree shall not be issued except upon
proof by the petitioning spouse that the nonpetitioning spouse has been
absent, or his or her whereabouts has been unknown, for six continuous
months from the time of application, time served in the armed forces
excluded.
Comment
This section is the heart of the procedure. It reflects a desire to
minimize the kind of state intervention which allows one
individual to force his or her will on the other. Six months after
the filing of an Application either or both spouses may petition
the court for a decree of divorce or separation. The burden is
placed on one or both of them to petition after expiration of the
statutory period in order to assure that one or both of them still
wish to divorce or separate.
The husband and wife may petition three months after filing of
the Application if they have concluded mutually satisfactory
arrangements for the custody of their children, property settle-
ments, and alimony. The purpose of allowing a shortened waiting
period for partners who agree on custody and finances, is to
encourage those who know they want a divorce to reach
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agreement on these matters. Although they are not immune from
mistake they are probably the most competent people to make
these decisions for their family; what goals they share, and what
resources are available to them. And they retain, of course, the
right to ask the court to help them decide or, if need be, decide
for them. Somewhat paternalistically, a three-month waiting
period is provided to increase the likelihood that their decision is
not hastily made. And only if they agree to obtain a divorce may
it be effected in less than six months. If either partner is unsure
about wanting a divorce, the statute insures that he will have the
full waiting period to attempt a conciliation. Once that period
ends, however, the objections of one spouse cannot prevent
divorce. If either husband or wife desires divorce, the court must
grant it.
Enforced separation is sometimes required in some reform
proposals as an essential condition for the grant of a divorce to
assure the state that the marriage has in fact "broken down," and
that the decision to divorce is not a hasty one. But a personal
decision to divorce, reached after a statutory "cooling off," or
"warming up," period, not only provides the desired assurances
but also allows opportunity for conciliation and counseling, for
any who wish to seek such assistance. Moreover, the statute allows
the marriage partners to remain together while considering
divorce. It avoids forcing them to assume the extra and often
intolerable financial burden of two abodes and allows them to face
the consequences of their decision together if they wish, instead of
forcing them to run away from it.1 9
The waiting period, which might be somewhat shorter or longer,
is. designed to serve a number of functions. First, it gives the
spouses time to reconsider whether they really want to be
divorced. During this period they may discuss their decision, seek
counseling, contemplate the consequences of divorce, and make
up their minds. Second, if the partners are firmly decided on a
divorce or separation, the waiting period provides an opportunity
19. Advocates of enforced separation as "proof" of marriage breakdown must have in
mind an image of the suburban husband who can go live at his club or his city or summer
residence for a few weeks while awaiting a divorce. For many people, especially the
poor, there is simply no place to which they can temporaily retreat for an enforced
separation. See text accompanying n.4 supra.
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for them carefully to arrange their post-divorce "family" life.
They may seek guidance on the best arrangements for their
children. They may negotiate about property or alimony. Or, they
may make use of the courts in settling their dispute under Section
VII which provides for special proceedings to hear and resolve
disagreements about finances and custody.
If the husband and wife reach agreement on custody and
finances, the agreement is ratified upon proof that it is
"informed," "voluntary," and "economically reasonable," and its
terms are incorporated into the divorce or separation Decree. By
allowing incorporation into the Decree of mutually agreed upon
financial and custody arrangements, the statute restricts inquiry
by the court normally to a finding of mutuality of the agreement.
When all parties, including children, are adequately represented,
"voluntariness" and "reasonableness" of the agreement should be
rebuttably presumed, and the court's scrutiny should not go to the
terms of the agreement except through general doctrines of
fairness in contracts such as fraud or duress. When all parties are
not adequately represented judicial scrutiny should go further and
insure that the agreement meets whatever standards the state has
adopted for child disposition and financial arrangements-e.g.,
"best interest of the child," "least detrimental to the child" or
"economically reasonable." 20 The requirement that the parties'
20. Since "fault" plays no part in the divorce proceedings, judicial inquiry here should
not entail the enormous invasions of privacy of current practice. We do oppose any
standards for awarding custody and resolving economic disputes which would
reintroduce "fault," though privacy may well have to be sacrificed to the extent very
personal matters can be established to be relevant to the best interest of the children, or
to a determination of financial need or financial capacity to pay.
As to alimony, we generally share the view of the Citizens' Advisory Council on the
Status of Women, see TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW, supra n. 15 at 7-22.
"Whether, how much and for how long alimony should be paid in a given case
necessarily involves consideration of a variety of factors. The task force suggests the
followhig as being among the criteria which are consistent with the economic partnership
view of marriage.
"1. In the traditional family, where the husband has been the chief source of income,
the contribution of the wife to the economic partnership of marriage may have been
great, as in a marriage of many years in which she was devoted to her family's well-being,
or it may have been minimal, as in a marriage of brief duration. Alimony should
recognize a contribution made by a spouse to the family's well-being which would
otherwise be without recompense.
"2. Alimony should provide recompense for loss of earning capacity suffered by either
spouse because of the marriage. For example, where a wife interrupts her career because
of homemaking and child rearing.
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agreement must be "informed," and "voluntary" and "econom-
ically reasonable" is designed to protect the unrepresented spouse,
uninformed of the law and of his or her rights, who is coerced by a
domineering spouse into an agreement which he or she will soon
regret.
Whenever the couple has been unable to reach an agreement on
custody and finances after six months have lapsed, whenever only
one spouse to the marriage is present, or whenever the children
object to those parts of an agreement which directly affect them,
the court holds a hearing on its own motion (under Section VII)
to determine custody and/or financial awards, which become part
of the Decree. In the absence of an agreement the court issues the
Decree immediately after Petition, in accord with the Proviso in
Subsection (a), but retains jurisdiction to decide the custody and
financial questions.
Section III. Residence Necessary for Divorce or Separation
The petition for a Decree of Divorce or Separation shall contain
affidavits or other documentary evidence that one of the parties to the
marriage has resided continuously within this State for one year prior to
the filing of an Application under Section I. If neither spouse has
continuously resided in the State for one year next before the filing of
the Application, the Petition for Decree of Divorce or Separation shall be
dismissed. For purposes of this section, any applicant who was domiciled
in the State at the time of marriage and has returned to the State before
filing the Application with the intention of permanently remaining, or
any applicant who has served or is serving with the armed forces, or the
merchant marine, and who was a resident of the State at the time of his
entry shall be deemed to have continuously resided in this State during
the time he was absent.
"3. If either spouse upon divorce is in fmancial need, some continuing responsibility on
the part of the other spouse to meet such need may be recognized for a period of time
after the dissolution of a marriage. One of the determinants of the proper period may be
the duration of the marriage; another might be whether the dependent spouse can or
should establish some other means of support, and if so, the time likely to be required to
do so.
"Alimony payments are sometimes used as a means of redressing wrongs suffered by
either spouse at the hands of the other. The spouse who is found at fault may be
required to pay more or to accept less. This encourages actions for divorce or separation
to explore the relative faults of the parties and is virtually certain to have undesirable
consequences for any future relations between the couple. Alimony should not be used
as a way of awarding compensation for damages."
HeinOnline -- 3 Fam. L.Q. 93 1969
94 Family Law Quarterly
Comment
A residence requirement of more than one year would be unfair to
new residents, particularly those who cannot afford a migratory
divorce. At the same time a shorter period might make divorce a
major industry as it is in Nevada.
The requirement of documentary evidence of residence obviates
the necessity of diverting judicial time from important issues.
Where the documentary evidence is defective on its face, or
missing, for example, the clerk could send the applying person a
form letter dismissing the Petition for reasons stated. Only where
there is a serious question about residence should the matter be
brought before the court, either by the other spouse, or by the
court on its own motion.
Section IV. Divorce After Separation
At any time not less than three months after a Decree of Separation has
been issued, either spouse or both spouses may petition the court for a
Decree of Divorce. Upon proof of the prior Decree of Separation, the
court shall issue a Decree of Divorce. The terms of the Separation Decree
regarding finances and custody of children shall be incorporated into the
Divorce Decree, uniess any of the parties requests to proceed as under
Sections II and VII.
Comment
No waiting period is required here because the Decree of
Separation may issue only after the waiting period. It is
contemplated that in most instances the terms of the Decree of
Separation will be incorporated into the divorce Decree. However,
all the parties, including children (in the matters of custody and
finances of concern to them), must so agree. If they do not, then
by the procedure of Sections II and VII the court resolves disputes
over custody and finances, and its order is incorporated in the
final Decree.
Section V. Effect of a Decree of Divorce
The Decree of Divorce shall restore to each of the spouses the status of
being single and unmarried.
Comment
The primary consequence of the status of being single is the right
of each spouse to remarry, including the right to remarry one
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another. No change in existing law on the consequences of
singleness is intended or contemplated.
Section VI. Effect of a Decree of Separation
The Decree of Separation shall enable the spouses to live separate and
apart under whatever arrangements have been mutually agreed upon or
have been ordered by the court in special proceedings under Sections II
and VII and shall enable them to use the facilities of the court in special
proceedings to conclude arrangements regarding finances and the custody
of children. The spouses' married status, however, shall not be terminated
under a Decree of Separation.
Comment
Legal separation is retained to offer those who wish to remain
married but to live apart, for any reasons they might have, an
opportunity to utilize the facilities of the court to make financial
and custody arrangements. The procedure for obtaining a Decree
of Separation is identical with the procedure for a Divorce Decree.
Section VII. Special Proceedings and Temporary Relief
a) SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. In case the parties to a marriage have
not agreed on mutually satisfactory arrangements regarding finances or
the custody of children, or both, any party, or all parties, may, at any
time after the filing of an Application for Divorce or Separation, petition
the court for a hearing designed to resolve the disputes. The Court may
hold a hearing regarding finances or custody of children on its own
motion whenever such hearing is required or allowed under this statute.
Any orders or settlements arising out of hearings under this section,
except for temporary orders, shall be made part of any Decree of Divorce
or Separation.
b) TEMPORARY RELIEF. At any time after Application for Divorce
or Separation, the court is empowered, upon motion of any party, to
order temporary custody, support, alimony, exclusion of a party from the
marital domicile, and whatever other temporary relief the circumstances
justify, pendente lite.
Such orders terminate upon the expiration of the Application, or the
entry of a Decree of Annulment, Divorce, or Separation, whichever first
occurs. If within one year of the lapse of the Application, a party
reapplies, the orders are reinstated as of the date of the Re-application.
Comment
This section should be read in conjunction with Section II. Under
Subsection (a) any of the parties, including the children through
their representatives, may request the court to settle their disputes
regarding finances and custody at any time after an Application
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for Divorce or Separation has been filed. The court is required to
hold a hearing on these matters whenever only one spouse is
present or when all the parties have failed to reach agreement
within six months of the filing of the Application. The court
would be guided by standards elsewhere established by the state
for disposition of children and financial awards.
It is contemplated that children of the marriage may have
independent representation and that the representative for the
children will be present at the proceedings to make the court
aware of any information deemed relevant to protect the interests
of the children.
Subsection (b) empowers the court to make temporary orders
for support, alimony, custody, separation, etc. No residence is
required to invoke this power since residence is required only
when petition for divorce or separation is made. Temporary orders
terminate upon either divorce or the expiration of the Applica-
tion. If no Decree of Divorce or Separation has been granted
before the Application expires, the statute provides that the terms
of the temporary orders may be renewed upon the renewal of the
Application within one year after it has lapsed. Any payments
required under the terms of the temporary orders begin again as of
the date of re-application. The person making the payments is not
required to pay for the period during which the Application was
not in force.
Section VIII. Annulment
An action to declare a marriage null and void shall be commenced and
proceed with the same procedure as for a Decree of Divorce or
Separation. Such actions shall be maintainable for the following reasons
only:
a) Incestuous Marriage-By either spouse, in case the marriage falls
within the forbidden degrees of consanguinity under [the relevant
statutory provision].
b) Bigamous Marriage-By either spouse where one of the spouses, at
the time of the marriage, is validly married to some other person.
c) Non-age-By the spouse under the legal age for marriage, or by the
spouse or by his or her personal representative if a minor.
Provided, however, that nothing in this section shall affect the initial
invalidity of incestuous or bigamous marriages. Actions under Subsection
(c) of this section must be commenced not later than six months after the
spouse reaches legal age for marriage.
Financial matters and custody of children shall be decided or resolved
as under Sections II and VII.
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Comment
This section provides for judicial declarations of the nullity of
certain marriages which may be void initially or voidable by
statute. Under certain circumstances it might be useful, and
perhaps necessary, for the parties to a void or voidable marriage to
obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of that relationship
without becoming "divorced." For example, a party to a void
incestuous marriage is sued out-of-state for support, bigamy,
adultery, etc. and seeks to defend on the grounds of the nullity of
the incestuous marriage. Without a judicial declaration of the
nullity of that marriage, it may be more difficult to prove the
nullity in a later action.
Annulment is limited to situations in which the marriage is
deemed initially invalid by specific statute and in which the
"grounds" for annulment are matters easily ascertained, without
invasion of individual privacy.
A short statute of limitations is provided in the case of non-age
to encourage those who have an intolerable relationship to use the
non-fault divorce procedures.
Section IX. Notice
Whenever notice is required under this chapter it shall be by pei. real
service, in the manner required under [the relevant statutory provisions].
If the noticed party resides outside the State, or if personal service fails,
the court shall order such other notice as is most likely to effect actual
notice under the circumstances, and may withhold any decree until its
order is complied with.
Comment
This section should be tailored to the practice of the individual
state regarding service and notice. The emphasis should be on
actual notice. Every reasonable effort must be made to effect
notice since many provisions of this proposal depend upon it.
Section X. Costs
If any applying or petitioning party is financially unable to pay the
court entry fee, other court costs, and sheriff's fees, and upon the filing
of an affidavit to that effect with the clerk of the court, such costs shall
be paid out of the general funds of the court.
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Comment
Many people are effectively barred from divorce because they are
financially unable to pay court costs and filing fees. For those on
welfare, whose assets generally are negligible, and whose state
welfare payments do not include money for legal expenses, the
cost is an insurmountable burden. Not only is this burden mani-
festly unfair in requiring wealth for access to the judicial process,
but it raises serious constitutional questions under the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 1
Waiver of costs is effected under this section by a simple
affidavit of financial inability to pay. 2 2 Inquiries into financial
status have been universally found expensive, time-consuming, and
ineffective; 2 3 they are, in addition, an unnecessary affront to the
dignity of the people involved.
Conclusion
The statute substantially limits the role of the state in divorce, as
in marriage, to a declaratory record-keeping, as opposed to an
adjudicatory, function. The statute does not, as has been noted,
include proposals for revising existing provisions concerning
property, alimony, support, child custory, or conciliation services.
21. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs, Boddie v. Connecticut, (D.C. Ct., May 7, 1968).
22. The phrase "financially unable to pay" is intended to convey the concept adopted
with respect to federal criminal cases in the Report of the Attorney General's Committee
on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, (1963):
"It is apparent that a total absence in the accused of all means and resources cannot be
[an adequate definition] ... Rather, the criterion appears to be a lack of financial
resources adequate to permit the accused to hire his own lawyer. Reflection led the
Committee to the conclusion that the poverty of the accused must be measured in
each case by reference to the particular need or service under consideration ... A
problem of poverty arises.., when at any stage of the proceedings lack of means in
the accused substantially inhibits or prevents the proper assertion of a right or claim of
right." Id. at 7-9.
23. Numerous state studies have tested the possibility of using affidavits in place
of detailed investigation in making welfare grants. These studies have shown that
fraud increases infinitesimally, administrative costs are reduced greatly, and, of course
there is much less invasion of privacy and subjection to indignities. Currently Alabama,
California, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Washington (state), Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin are testing projects or are using an
affidavit system statewide. For a discussion of the success of some of these projects, see
Note, Eligibility Determination in Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals
for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1307 (1967).
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It may be enacted without major amendments to existing
statutory piovisions in those areas. However, it is hoped that
adoption of such a proposal will lead to a full-scale reexamination
not only of procedures and policies for resolving disputes about
children and money but also of what may be the most promising
opportunity for safe-guarding marital and family relationships-the
policies and procedures for issuing licenses to marry. Rather than
licenses to establish sexual relationships, marriage licenses may
become in law, as they seem to be in fact, licenses to establish
families, that is licenses to bear and, more importantly, rear
children. 2 4
24. See K. Keniston, Youth, Change and Violence 37 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR
227, 232 (1968).
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